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Abstract
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is the crown jewel of the world’s most
advanced international system for protecting civil and political liberties. In recent years,
however, the ECtHR has become a victim of its own success. The Court now faces a docket
crisis of massive proportions, the consequence of the growing number of states subject to
its jurisdiction, its favourable public reputation, its expansive interpretations of individual
liberties, a distrust of domestic judiciaries in some countries, and entrenched human rights
problems in others. In response to this growing backlog of individual complaints, the Council
of Europe has, over the last ﬁve years, considered numerous proposals to restructure the European human rights regime and redesign the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
This article argues that these proposals should be understood not as ministerial changes in
supranational judicial procedure, nor as resolving a debate over whether the ECtHR should
strive for individual or constitutional justice, but rather as raising more fundamental questions concerning the Court’s future identity. In particular, the article argues for recognition
of ‘embeddedness’ in national legal systems as a deep structural principle of the ECHR, a principle that functions as a necessary counterpoint to the subsidiary doctrine that has animated
the Convention since its founding. Embeddedness does not substitute ECtHR rulings for the
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decisions of national parliaments or domestic courts. Rather, it requires the Council of Europe
and the Court to bolster the mechanisms for governments to remedy human rights violations
at home, obviating the need for individuals to seek supranational relief and restoring countries
to a position in which the ECtHR’s deference to national decision-makers is appropriate.

1 Introduction
The achievements of the European Convention on Human Rights (the European Convention; the Convention; ECHR)1 and its supreme judicial tribunal, the European Court
of Human Rights (the ECtHR or the Court), are widely acclaimed by scholars, lawyers,
government ofﬁcials, and human rights advocates. Since its founding over 50 years ago,
the Convention has expanded along three axes – jurisprudentially, institutionally, and
geographically. What was once an agreement among a small group of Western European states to guarantee core civil and political liberties by means of an optional judicial
review mechanism has now been supplemented by 14 protocols, one of which – Protocol
No. 11 – recast the ECtHR as a permanent, full-time court with compulsory jurisdiction
over all member states to which aggrieved individuals enjoy direct access.2 Following
the accession to the Council of Europe of former Soviet bloc states, the ECtHR’s reach
now extends to more than 800 million people in 47 countries stretching the length and
breadth of the continent and beyond, from Azerbaijan to Iceland and from Gibraltar
to Vladivostok. It is no exaggeration to state that the Convention and its growing and
diverse body of case law have transformed Europe’s legal and political landscape, qualifying the ECtHR as the world’s most effective international human rights tribunal.
Recent news from the Council of Europe’s headquarters in Strasbourg, France, is
not so good, however. Since 2000, the Council’s political bodies, legal experts, and
the judges of the Court have been engaged in an intensive exercise in institutional
reform.3 To state the problem bluntly, the ECHR is becoming a victim of its own success and now faces a docket crisis of massive proportions. A combination of factors –
the Court’s positive public reputation, its expansive interpretations of the Convention,
a distrust of domestic judiciaries in some countries, and entrenched human rights
problems in others – has attracted tens of thousands of new individual applications
annually. The crush of cases shows no sign of abating and threatens to bury ECtHR
judges and Registry lawyers in paper.4 Dozens of resolutions, recommendations, and
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 Nov. 1950, 213 UNTS
222 (hereinafter European Convention).
Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, ETS No. 155.
For a useful review of these activities and a discussion of their signiﬁcance see Caﬂisch, ‘The Reform of
the European Court of Human Rights: Protocol No. 14 and Beyond’, 6 Human Rts L Rev (2006) 403,
at 403–415; S. Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects
(2006), at 136–165.
See Caﬂisch, supra note 3, at 404 (‘With its 45 judges and about 250 Registry lawyers, the Court is
presently confronted with an accumulated case-load of 82,600 applications, out of which 45,550 were
made in 2005, the yearly capacity of absorption of the Court now being at around 28,000 cases’).
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experts’ reports reiterate the same prophetic message: if drastic steps are not taken,
the rosy picture of the ECtHR’s efﬁcacy sketched in the previous paragraph may soon
be only a historical portrait.
Discussions of how to ensure the survival of the ECtHR have been framed principally in terms of modifying the Court’s institutional structures and its procedures
to manage more efﬁciently the growing backlog of cases. For example, what additional resources and personnel does the Court require? How many judges should
review complaints at different stages of the proceedings? Is there a need for a separate
chamber dedicated to deciding admissibility issues? Can judges do more to encourage
friendly settlements? Yet lurking beneath these often technocratic issues of judicial
housekeeping are profound substantive questions about how the Court accomplishes
its core mandate – protecting civil and political liberties enshrined in the Convention – and whether the mechanisms it uses to achieve that goal need to be revised in
response to changes in the legal and political landscape of human rights protection
in Europe.
To the extent that the substantive dimension of the ECtHR reform process has
received a public airing, the debate has focused on whether the Court should provide ‘individual’ or ‘constitutional’ justice. Advocates of the former view argue
that the right of individual petition is the centrepiece of the Strasbourg supervisory system and, as a result, that the ECtHR should ‘hear any case, from anyone
who claims to be a victim of the Convention’ and provide a remedy to every individual whose human rights have been violated.5 Proponents of the latter position
– including the most recent past President of the Court and its Registrar6 – argue
that the ECtHR should concentrate on providing ‘fully reasoned and authoritative
[decisions] in cases which raise substantial or new and complex issues of human
rights law, are of particular signiﬁcance for the State concerned or involve allegations of serious human rights violations and which warrant a full process of considered adjudication’.7
In this article, I argue that neither the technocratic, procedural view of the
ECtHR reform process nor the debate between individual and constitutional justice
proponents adequately captures the nature and scope of the challenges facing the
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These statistics are current as of 1 May 2006: ibid., at 404 n. 3. The backlog of cases ‘is projected to
rise to 250,000 by 2010’. The Right Hon. The Lord Woolf et al., Review of the Working Methods of the
European Court of Human Rights at 8 (Dec. 2005), available at: www.echr.coe.int/eng/press/2005/Dec/
LORDWOOLFSREVIEWONWORKINGMETHODS2.pdf
Dembour, ‘“Finishing Off” Cases: the Radical Solution to the Problem of the Expanding ECTHR Caseload’
[2002] European Human Rts L Rev 604, at 621; see also Leach, ‘Access to the European Court of Human
Rights – From a Legal Entitlement to a Lottery?’, 27 Human Rts LJ (2006) 11.
See, e.g., Wildhaber, ‘A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights’, 23 Human Rts LJ
(2002) 161, at 162–163; Mahoney, ‘New Challenges for the European Court of Human Rights Resulting
from the Expanding Caseload and Membership’, 21 Pennsylvania State Int’l L Rev (2002) 101, at 105.
Committee of Experts for the Improvement of Procedures for the Protection of Human Rights, Report of the
Evaluation Group to Examine Possible Means of Guaranteeing the Effectiveness of the European Court of Human
Rights, Doc. EG Court (2001), at para. 98 (27 Sept. 2001) (internal quotations omitted).
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Strasbourg supervisory system. In particular, the looming docket crisis has exposed
and accelerated an incipient identity crisis for the Court, one whose origins date back
nearly a decade to the structural changes ushered in by Protocol No. 11. This crisis
has led the ECtHR to become increasingly embedded in the national legal systems of
the Convention’s member states, often exercising functions that differ radically from
those that the treaty’s drafters and the ﬁrst generations of ECtHR judges had envisaged. More provocatively, I argue that ‘embeddedness’ should serve as the touchstone
for evaluating the diverse array of proposals to redesign and restructure the Court to
ensure its future success.
Even casual observers of the ECtHR will immediately take issue with these claims.
They appear, on ﬁrst impression, to be directly contrary to the principle of subsidiarity that has served as a cornerstone of the European Convention since its founding. In the context of European human rights adjudication, subsidiarity orients the
relationship between supranational and national decision-makers.8 It proceeds
from the premise that the Strasbourg institutions are ‘supplementary and subsidiary to the protection of rights and freedoms under national legal systems’, whose
political, administrative, and judicial authorities retain the ‘primary responsibility’ for guaranteeing the rights of individuals.9 Although not expressly mentioned
in the Convention, subsidiarity ﬁnds its animating spirit in textual provisions such
as the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule and the obligation to provide an effective national remedy.10 It also informs ECtHR jurisprudence, including the margin of
appreciation doctrine and the tribunal’s refusal to act as a fourth-instance appeal of
national court rulings.11
Both functional and normative rationales justify the subsidiarity principle. From
a functional perspective, treating the Strasbourg supervisory system as ancillary to
national mechanisms of human rights protection is a practical necessity. ‘In view of
the limited resources at [the system’s] disposal, considerations of judicial expediency
and efﬁciency’, require domestic judges and administrative bodies to act as the ﬁrstline defenders of Convention rights and freedoms.12 Normatively, subsidiarity helps
to legitimize ECtHR review by providing a measure of deference to national actors
in situations where such deference is appropriate – such as identifying the content
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For a more comprehensive analysis of subsidiarity that extends beyond the European Convention see
Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law’, 97 AJIL (2003) 38,
at 39 (explaining the ‘original and most comprehensive sense’ of subsidiarity and exploring its ‘deep afﬁnities … with many of the implicit premises of international human rights norms, including presuppositions about the dignity and freedom of human persons, the importance of their association with others,
and the role of the state with respect to smaller social groups as well as individuals’).
Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (2002), at 236.
European Convention, supra note 1, Art. 13 (obligating member states to provide an effective national
remedy) and Art. 35 (exhaustion of domestic remedies).
See R. Blackburn and J. Polakiewicz, Fundamental Rights in Europe: The ECHR and its Member States, 19502000 (2001), at p. xiv.
Arai-Takahashi, supra note 9, at 235.
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of and values underlying national laws and practices or choosing among a range of
Convention-compatible implementation measures.13
These twin justiﬁcations for subsidiarity have shaped the evolution of the Strasbourg
supervisory system. National governments established the Convention as an early
warning system to sound the alarm in case Europe’s ﬂedgling democracies began to
backslide toward totalitarianism.14 Over time, the Court assumed additional functions
that are implicit in the Convention’s text and structure – ‘protecting individuals and
groups from the excesses of majoritarianism in healthy democracies’ and resolving the
relatively minor and discrete conﬂicts of interests prevalent in any complex society.15 A
supranational judicial system designed to achieve these goals need only supplement, not
supplant, national courts and other domestic mechanisms of human rights protection.
By the ﬁrst decade of the 21st century, however, the ECtHR was exercising these
functions with decreasing frequency. The Court now primarily concerns itself not
with ﬂagging and clearing roadblocks in domestic democratic processes or adjudicating good faith government restrictions on individual liberties, but rather with
issues that are both far less and far more momentous. At one end of the spectrum,
over half of the Court’s docket is populated with repetitive, ‘cookie cutter’ complaints
challenging insufﬁciently resourced and overburdened domestic judicial systems.16
Cases of this type have led the ECtHR to identify structural problems in civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings in countries that are otherwise stable and wellfunctioning democracies.17 At the other end of the spectrum are claims of serious and
pervasive human rights abuses such as extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture,
and prolonged arbitrary detention.18 Applicants in these cases have no meaningful
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See, e.g., Greer, supra note 3, at 216; Petzold, ‘The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity’, in R. St.
J. Macdonald, F. Matscher, and H. Petzold (eds), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights
(1993), at 41, 60.
See Moravcsik, ‘The Origins of International Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar
Europe’, 54 Int’l Org (2000) 217.
Greer, supra note 3, at 40; see A.H. Robertson and J.H. Merrills, Human Rights in the World (3rd edn.,
1989), at 62.
See Caﬂisch, supra note 3, at 405 (estimating that ‘more than half of the applications addressed to the
Court concern Article 6 (fair trial), and at least half of these – i.e. one quarter of the total number of
applications – concern the excessive length of proceedings’); Greer, supra note 3, at 74–76 (analysing
ECtHR judgments ﬁnding breaches of the Convention from 1999 to 2005 and concluding that over 75%
concerned violations of fair trial rights or length of proceedings rules); see also Cichowski, ‘Courts, Rights
and Democratic Participation’, 39 Comparative Political Stud (2006) 50, at 65 (noting the large number of
fair trial cases before the ECtHR and explaining how the Court’s judgments ‘play a critical role in expanding domestic access to legal institutions for private parties’).
See App. No. 31210/96, Kudła v. Poland (2000), at para. 148 (stating that the Court has ‘draw[n] attention to the important danger that exists for the rule of law within national legal orders when excessive
delays in the administration of justice occur in respect of which litigants have no domestic remedy’) (quotations omitted); see also Wolf, ‘Trial Within a Reasonable Time: the Recent Reforms of the Italian Justice
System in Response to the Conﬂict with Article 6(1) of the ECHR’, 9 Eur Public L (2003) 189.
See Mahoney, ‘Speculating on the Future of the Reformed European Court of Human Rights’, 20 Human
Rts LJ (1999) 1, at 4 (predicting that, with accession of former Soviet bloc countries to the Convention,
the ECtHR would be confronted with ‘serious human rights violations’ such as ‘minorities in conﬂict with
[a] central government’ and cases relating to ‘terrorism, violence, and civil strife’).
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domestic remedies to exhaust, forcing the Court to function as both a ﬁrst instance
ﬁnder of fact and a legal arbiter with respect to governments that sometimes resist its
powers of review.19
The arguments for subsidiarity and for deference to national decision-makers are
far less persuasive in cases that occupy both ends of this spectrum. But these cases also
highlight a more general and more fundamental point. If the ECHR now confronts
human rights problems unlike those that motivated its founding after the Second
World War, the actors that control the Court’s future – the member states, the Council of Europe’s political and expert bodies, and the ECHR judges themselves – must
devise new structural solutions to those problems. Strategically embedding the ECtHR
in national legal systems provides such solutions where the justiﬁcations for subsidiarity are lacking.
Embeddedness, as deﬁned in this article, does not ask the Court to take the place
of national parliaments or national courts. To the contrary, it requires the redesigning of the Council of Europe’s supervisory system – including the work of its political
and expert bodies as well as those of the ECHR – to bolster the remedies that domestic
judges and legislatures provide to individuals whose rights have been violated.20 Such
bolstering is essential to move (or to restore) countries to a position in which greater
deference to national decision-makers is (or is once again) appropriate. Stated differently, embeddedness is a deep structural principle of the European Convention, one
that provides an essential counterpoint to the deep structural principle of subsidiarity
described above.21
The remainder of this article makes the case for redesigning the Strasbourg supervisory system to embed the ECtHR more ﬁrmly in national legal systems. Part 2
begins by situating the embeddedness principle in existing interdisciplinary scholarship and analysing the values of embeddedness for the long-term effectiveness of the
European human rights regime. It then explains the distinction between direct and
diffuse embeddedness and distinguishes those concepts from the individual and constitutional justice rationales for ECtHR review. Part 3 documents how, in numerous and
19
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See Memorandum on Threats to Applicants to the European Court of Human Rights in Cases from Chechnya, in Parliamentary Assembly, Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Member
States’ Duty to Co-operate with the European Court of Human Rights, Doc 11183, App. I (9 Feb. 2007), available at: http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/workingdocs/doc07/edoc11183.htm
(documenting the Russian authorities’ ‘lack of willingness to effectively investigate’ the murder, disappearance, beating, and harassment of individuals who had ﬁled applications with the ECtHR alleging
extrajudicial killings and disappearances of civilians in Chechnya).
See generally Slaughter and Burke-White, ‘The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, The European Way of Law)’, 47 Harvard J Int’l L (2006) 327, at 328 (‘[T]he primary terrain of international law
must shift … from independent regulation above the national state to direct engagement with domestic institutions. The three principal forms of such engagement are strengthening domestic institutions,
backstopping them, and compelling them to act’).
See Bradley Kar, ‘The Deep Structure of Law and Morality’, 84 Texas L Rev (2006) 877, at 882 (explaining that many scholars use the term ‘deep structure’ to describe the foundational principles embedded in
laws and legal institutions); Fletcher, ‘What Law is Like’, 50 Southern Methodist U L Rev (1997) 1599, at
1604 and n. 22 (discussing the increasing prevalence of the term ‘deep structure’ to describe these same
principles).
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diverse ways, the Court’s judgments are already becoming more deeply embedded in
national legal systems. In some instances, member states and the Council of Europe’s
political bodies have endorsed these developments. In others, the ECtHR has modiﬁed its jurisprudence to establish greater control over domestic political and judicial
decision-makers. Part 4 uses the embeddedness principle to evaluate several recently
adopted and proposed reforms of the ECtHR. It then considers additional ways further
to embed the European human rights regime in national legal systems in appropriate
cases, as well as impediments to these proposals.

2 The Concept of Embeddedness and the European Human
Rights Regime
This part ﬁrst brieﬂy reviews earlier international law and international relations
scholarship that examines the effects of embedding international institutions in
national legal and political systems. It then analyses the values of embeddedness for
protecting the rights enshrined in the European Convention and further reﬁnes the
concept by distinguishing between direct and diffuse varieties of embeddedness. Part
2 concludes by situating embeddedness in recent debates over whether the ECtHR
should strive to provide individual or constitutional justice.

A Previous Analyses of Embeddedness
Several strands of scholarship consider how embedding international institutions
in national legal systems improves the prospects for compliance with international
law in general and the judgments of international tribunals in particular. Scholars
use different labels to describe various facets of embeddedness. But the central idea
that unites their work is the claim that compliance with international law increases
when international institutions – including tribunals – can penetrate the surface of
the state to interact with government decision-makers and private actors and to inﬂuence domestic politics.
In an early and inﬂuential contribution, Robert Keohane described the process of
‘institutional enmeshment’, which ‘occurs when domestic decision making with
respect to an international commitment is affected by the institutional arrangements
established in the course of making or maintaining the commitment’.22 States that are
not enmeshed institutionally ‘may be legally obligated by international law to comply
with their commitments’. But because these obligations are ‘not constitutionalized’ in
the country’s domestic legal and political structures, ‘they can be met or not as the state
decides’.23 By contrast, Keohane argues, countries that are institutionally enmeshed
have ‘an increase[d] … probability of compliance’, all other things being equal.24

22

23
24

Keohane, ‘Compliance with International Commitments: Politics within a Framework of Law’, 86 Am
Soc’y Int’l L Proceedings (1992) 176, at 179.
Ibid.
Ibid., at 180.
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Harold Koh’s transnational legal process theory emphasizes a different dimension
of embeddedness. He describes the ‘vertical internalization of international norms
into domestic legal systems’25 that occurs when ‘nation states, corporations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations interact in a variety of fora
to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately internalize rules of international law’.26
For Koh, these interactions generate a complex process ‘whereby international legal
norms seep into, are internalized, and become embedded in domestic legal and political processes’ through ‘executive action, legislation, and judicial decisions which take
account of and incorporate international norms’.27 With respect to human rights in
particular, Koh argues that ‘embed[ding] certain human rights principles into international and domestic law should trigger transnational interactions, that generate
legal interpretations, that can in turn be internalized into the domestic law of even
resistant nation states’.28
Other scholars have analysed embeddedness as an aspect of an international tribunal’s institutional design. In a study of the ECtHR and the European Court of Justice
(ECJ), Anne-Marie Slaughter and I stressed the ‘supranational jurisdiction’ of the two
European Courts as a key ingredient of their success.29 Such jurisdiction gives private
parties direct access to the tribunals and ‘creat[es] a constituency for their judgments
that is interested and able to pressure domestic government institutions to take heed
and comply with those judgments’.30 We also emphasized how ‘the judges on the
ECJ and the ECHR have exploited the opportunities granted them by the provision
of supranational jurisdiction’, in particular by forging relationships with the disaggregated branches of national governments. ‘The ECJ deliberately wooed national
courts, and the ECHR earned support from courts, administrative agencies, and some
national legislators.’31
A later article by Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter
identiﬁed embeddedness as one of three variables that inﬂuences the effectiveness of
international tribunals.32 The study deﬁned embeddedness as ‘the extent to which dispute resolution decisions can be implemented without governments having to take
actions to do so’.33 Such implementation is automatic where ‘autonomous national
courts can enforce international judgments against their own governments’.34 But it
is also possible where a state ‘has incorporated or transposed [a treaty] into domestic
25
26
27
28
29

30
31
32

33
34

Koh, ‘How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’, 74 Indiana LJ (1999) 1397, at 1403.
Koh, ‘On American Exceptionalism’, 55 Stanford L Rev (2003) 1479, at 1502.
Koh, ‘Transnational Legal Process’, 75 Nebraska L Rev (1996) 181, at 205, 204.
Koh, supra note 26, at 1502.
Helfer and Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’, 107 Yale LJ (1997)
273, at 277.
Ibid., at 387.
Ibid.
Keohane et al., ‘Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational’, 54 Int’l Org (2000) 457.
The two other variables are the tribunal’s access rules and its independence from the states subject to its
jurisdiction.
Ibid., at 458.
Ibid., at 467.
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law subject to the oversight of an autonomous domestic legal system’.35 As an example of the latter type of embeddedness, the authors cite the fact that ‘[m]any governments have … incorporated the European Convention into domestic law, permitting
individuals to enforce its provisions before domestic courts. Despite the lack of a direct
link [between European and domestic judges], there is evidence that domestic courts
tend to follow the jurisprudence of the ECHR in interpreting the Convention.’36

B The Values of Embeddedness for the Strasbourg Supervisory System
Building upon these prior analyses, this section identiﬁes and analyses the values of
embeddedness as a principle for protecting the civil and political liberties enshrined in
the European Convention.
At a practical level, embedding the regional human rights regime in national legal
systems protects a larger number of individuals in a more expeditious fashion. Even
after the reforms of Protocol No. 11, budget increases, and the appointment of additional Registry staff, review by the ECtHR remains a complex and time-consuming
process. Thousands of individuals ﬁle complaints with the Court too early (before
exhausting domestic remedies) or too late (beyond the Convention’s six-month limitations period),37 a statistic that illustrates the widespread lack of knowledge about the
Strasbourg system and the large pool of applicants whose possibly meritorious claims
are beyond the ECtHR’s review. For applicants who successfully hurdle the treaty’s
admissibility rules, there is a considerable delay before the Court issues a judgment
on the merits. Indeed, it is something of an irony that the length of time cases remain
pending before the ECtHR sometimes exceeds the maximum length of proceedings
that the Convention allows in national courts.38
Embeddedness also signiﬁcantly improves the prospects for compliance with the
European Convention.39 It does so by enabling national courts to protect the Convention’s civil and political liberties as incorporated into domestic law – whether in
the form of a self-executing treaty, the individual rights clauses of a constitution, or
ordinary legislation. When Strasbourg rights and freedoms are fully domesticated in
one of these ways, compliance with international law and national law approaches
convergence. Stated differently, to the extent that a state accepts the rule of law at
home, it also necessarily adheres to the rule of law internationally. Courts can further
increase compliance (and pre-empt the ﬁling of potentially embarrassing complaints

35
36
37

38

39

Ibid., at 468.
Ibid.
See Caﬂisch, supra note 3, at 405 (stating that the ECtHR rejects over 90% of complaints because the applicants cannot satisfy the Convention’s admissibility rules).
See European Convention, supra note 1, Art. 6(1) (requiring a hearing to determine criminal charges
and civil rights and obligations ‘within a reasonable time’); S. Stavros, The Guarantees for Accused Persons
Under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1993), at 77–115 (analysing the right to
proceedings of a reasonable length). I am grateful to David Weissbrodt for drawing my attention to this
arresting fact.
Whether embeddedness enhances member states’ compliance with ECtHR judgments is a more complex
subject that I address in the next section.
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in Strasbourg) by providing remedies to individuals whose rights have been violated.40 Moreover, embeddedness creates a dynamic compliance process. As discussed
in greater detail below, courts often adjust their interpretation of the Convention as
incorporated in domestic law in response to evolutions in ECtHR case law.
In addition to these practical beneﬁts, embeddedness is normatively desirable. The
framers envisaged the European Convention not as a rigidly uniform charter but
rather as ‘set[ting] a universal minimum standard which nonetheless … allows some
scope, albeit not unlimited, for properly functioning democracies to choose different
solutions adapted to their different and evolving societies’.41 It is precisely because
‘legally, politically, and culturally heterogeneous national governments can develop
divergent but not necessarily incompatible approaches to common legal problems
that the Court has afforded them a context-based zone of discretion when reviewing
compliance with their treaty obligations and in balancing those obligations against
other important interests’.42 Seen from this perspective, embeddedness helps to promote a shared regional responsibility for protecting human rights, one that helps to
create a European ‘community of law’43 by ‘giv[ing] room to national institutions to
appropriate the Convention and make it their own’.44

C Direct and Diffuse Embeddedness Compared
The studies reviewed above identify the basic contours of embeddedness. But they do
not fully capture the ways in which international courts can be entrenched in domestic legal and political institutions. In this section, I provide a more ﬁne-grained analysis of judicial embeddedness and apply it to the European human rights regime. A key
component of this more nuanced approach is the distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘diffuse’ embeddedness. The ECHR is not directly embedded in national legal systems. But
its diffuse embeddedness in those systems provides the Court with numerous opportunities to inﬂuence the decision-making of judges, legislators, and executive ofﬁcials.
It is those opportunities, I argue later in this article, that the Council of Europe should
exploit when considering how to redesign the region’s human rights regime.

40

41

42

43
44

Cf. Kumm and Ferreres Comella, ‘The Primacy Clause of the Constitutional Treaty and the Future of Constitutional Conﬂict in the European Union’, 3 Int’l J Const L (2005) 473, at 486 (‘To prevent international
embarrassment, both the national courts and the political branches feel that it is better to protect rights
“at home,” as it were’).
Mahoney, ‘Universality versus Subsidiarity in the Strasbourg Case Law on Free Speech: Explaining Some
Recent Judgments’ [1997] European Human Rts L Rev 364, at 369.
Helfer, ‘Adjudicating Copyright Claims under the TRIPs Agreement: the Case for a European Human
Rights Analogy’, 39 Harvard Int’l LJ (1998) 357, at 396; see also Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, ECtHR,
Series A No. 30 (1979), at para. 61 (‘[T]he main purpose of the Convention is to lay down certain international standards to be observed by the Contracting States in their relations with persons under their
jurisdiction. This does not mean absolute uniformity is required and, indeed, since the Contracting States
remain free to choose the measures which they consider appropriate, the Court cannot be oblivious of the
substantive or procedural features of their respective domestic laws’) (internal quotations omitted).
Helfer and Slaughter, supra note 29, at 367–373, 389–391.
Carozza, supra note 8, at 75.
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Consider direct embeddedness ﬁrst. The ECtHR does not occupy a formal place in
the judicial hierarchies of the European Convention’s member states. It has no appellate jurisdiction to review the decisions of national courts, nor is there any mechanism
for judges to refer to Strasbourg questions of human rights law that arise during the
course of domestic litigation. The Court cannot quash national court rulings nor order
national governments to amend legislation or revise administrative practices.45 In
addition, ECtHR judgments are, with only two exceptions, not ‘executable within …
domestic legal systems’.46 Thus, if an international tribunal’s embeddedness is characterized by its inclusion in an integrated judicial hierarchy – what I label as ‘direct’
embeddedness – the ECHR is not embedded in national legal systems. This provides
a sharp contrast with the ECJ, which, as a result of the preliminary reference procedure and the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect, occupies a place at the apex
of the judicial systems in all European Union Member States with respect to issues of
EU law.47
Although the ECtHR lacks direct embeddedness, it has numerous characteristics of
‘diffuse’ embeddedness. A diffusely embedded international tribunal employs a variety
of mechanisms to inﬂuence the behaviour of national decision-makers. The efﬁcacy of
these tools hinges not on the coercive power that a higher court exercises over a lower
judicial body. Rather, it requires the skilful use of persuasion to realign the interests
and incentives of decision-makers in favour of compliance with the tribunals’ judgments. In this sense, diffuse embeddedness is linked to the socializing functions that
international institutions can exert over the behaviour of national actors.48
Several design features of the European human rights regime reﬂect the ECtHR’s diffuse embeddedness in national legal systems. First, the Court frequently reviews challenges to domestic judicial decisions that interpret and apply constitutions, legislation,
and administrative practices. When Strasbourg judges conclude that these decisions
violate one or more Convention-protected liberties, states must, whenever possible,
restore the complainant to the position he or she occupied prior to the violation. To
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the Ukraine adopted a statute and a Presidential decree to follow the same approach. See Sviriba, ‘Enforcing Judgments of the ECHR’, Magister & Partners, International Law Ofﬁce (12 Sept. 2006), available
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See Goodman and Jinks, ‘How to Inﬂuence States: Socialization and International Human Rights’, 54
Duke LJ (2004) 621, at 635–638.
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meet this obligation, national governments have quashed criminal convictions, expedited trials, and re-opened closed judicial proceedings.49
In this sense, ECtHR judgments do modify and overturn the rulings of domestic courts. But achieving these outcomes requires the afﬁrmative intervention of a
state’s political branches, and the Court has traditionally avoided policing such interventions. As I explain below, however, the ECtHR has recently begun to identify remedies with greater speciﬁcity and to scrutinize more intensively how states enforce its
judgments.50
A second dimension of diffuse embeddedness concerns the relationship between the
ECtHR and national parliaments. Consistent with the Strasbourg supervisory system’s
lack of direct embeddedness, the Court’s judgments are binding only as a matter of
international law and only upon the parties to the dispute.51 But their practical effects
are often more extensive. Parliamentarians across Europe sometimes consult ECtHR
case law when drafting and revising statutes and administrative regulations.52 When
these consultations occur, they extend the Court’s inﬂuence even in the absence of
an adverse judgment against the state.53 There is no obligation, however, for government decision-makers to give ECHR judgments this erga omnes effect.54 This is so even
for Systemic human rights problems that adversely affect numerous individuals. As I
explain below, however, the ECtHR has recently developed a mechanism to address
such systemic violations, one that will increase the dialogue between the Court and
national parliaments.
A third manifestation of diffuse embeddedness relates to the common legal texts
that the ECtHR and national courts interpret. For the ﬁrst few decades of the Convention’s life, its member states were divided into two camps – those that had incorporated the treaty into domestic law and those that had not. In the latter group of
countries, domestic courts could not provide a remedy to individuals whose rights had
been violated. These states fulﬁlled their treaty obligations by giving effect to ECtHR
judgments on a case-by-case basis.55 As the Strasbourg system matured, the number
of incorporation countries increased so that, by the early years of the new millennium,
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See infra Part 3C.
See European Convention, supra note 1, Art. 53(1) (‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by
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Court of Human Rights’, in T. Christou and J.P. Raymond (eds), European Court of Human Rights: Remedies
and Execution of Judgments (2005), at 1, 15, 19.
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the Convention had ‘become an integral part of the domestic legal orders of all states
parties’.56 This integration enables national courts to apply the treaty directly as
embodied in domestic law.
There is, however, no necessary correlation between the continent-wide incorporation of the Convention and the embeddedness of ECtHR judgments. As the treaty
has come to stand on a ﬁrmer domestic footing, judges have paid greater attention
to the growing number of international cases interpreting it. Yet consistently with
the ECHR’s lack of direct embeddedness, domestic courts have reserved to themselves
at least a modicum of independent interpretive authority. This judicial independence
exists even in states in which the Convention is on a par with the constitution. According to former ECtHR Judge Georg Ress, it may seem obvious that national courts in
such countries would ‘feel obliged to scrupulously follow any reasoning of the ECHR’.
In fact, he explains, there is:
a difference between the Convention as part of the constitution and the Convention as an international treaty interpreted by the ECHR. Within the domestic legal order, the Convention is
only one element in the mosaic of different constitutional provisions and its interpretation in
that context may differ considerably from an interpretation based on the Convention alone.57

As a result of this distinction, domestic courts may not ‘fully follow the reasoning of
the ECHR’ if it does not accord with the text and aquis of national law.58 The result,
in short, is that ECtHR judgments are persuasive authority. They are highly persuasive, to be sure. But they retain their status as interpretations of international law
until they have been domesticated by national courts.59 Whether such domestication
in fact occurs may depend on which judge hears the case. Constitutional courts in
Europe have a consistent track record of taking Strasbourg case law seriously. Lower
tribunals, by contrast, have shown a decided ‘lack of enthusiasm’ for applying the
Convention as interpreted by the ECtHR.60 The challenge the Strasbourg tribunal
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Appendix to Recommendation Rec(2004)6 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the improvement of domestic remedies (12 May 2004), at 3–4. This new unity harbours a diversity of a different
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See Hoffmeister, supra note 47, at 726–728; Ress, supra note 46, at 375–376.
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Ibid.
This view is conﬁrmed by a 2002 conference of European constitutional courts at which 21 such courts
‘declare[d] themselves not bound by the rulings of the [ECHR]’, but an even larger number noted ‘the
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basic rights guaranteed by internal law and the extent of the restrictions that can be placed on them’:
Conference of European Constitutional Courts, XIIth Congress, General Report: The relations between the
Constitutional Courts and the other national courts, including the interference in this area of the action of the
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138

EJIL 19 (2008), 125–159

faces, therefore, is how to encourage judges at all levels of domestic judicial systems to
follow its jurisprudence.

D Distinguishing Embeddedness from Constitutional and
Individual Justice
Claims that the ECtHR is a sui generis international tribunal have a distinguished academic pedigree. The Court itself has fuelled these claims by interpreting the Convention
not as set of reciprocal promises among nations, but, far more momentously, as a ‘constitutional instrument of European public order’.61 The ECtHR maintains that order by
calibrating the proper balance between independent judicial review and deference to
national decision-makers. On the one hand, the Court stresses the subsidiary nature
of the treaty’s ‘supervision machinery’ in relation to ‘national human rights protection systems’.62 Once a dispute comes before it, however, the ECtHR reviews domestic
legislation, administrative practices, and judicial rulings using distinctive methods of
treaty analysis – such as the doctrine of effectiveness, the principle of autonomous
interpretation, and an evolving understanding of protected rights and freedoms.63
Over time, the Court has manipulated these jurisprudential tools to engender ‘a slow
but constant change of the sphere of sovereignty of the modern [European] state’.64 As
a result of this incremental erosion of state power, many scholars now argue that the
ECtHR has transformed itself into a regional constitutional court.65
The consequences of this appellation are muddied, however, by the multiplicity of
meanings associated with constitutional courts and constitutional review. At the most
basic level, labelling the ECtHR as a constitutional court merely acknowledges that
Strasbourg judges test the validity of legislation against higher-order rules protecting
individual rights, much as do their domestic counterparts.66 A second, more sophisticated approach deﬁnes constitutional review as a method of judicial decision-making.
Seen in this light, the ECtHR pursues ‘constitutional justice’ when it adjudicates on
cases that contribute ‘to the identiﬁcation, condemnation, and resolution of [Convention] violations … which are serious for the applicant, for the respondent state … or
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for Europe as a whole’.67 A third perspective sees the ECtHR as a constitutional court
when it acts didactically, shaping its case law to socialize domestic institutions to the
democratic and rule of law values that the Convention embodies.68 These three views
of the Strasbourg system’s constitutional functions contrast with an ‘individual justice’ conception of human rights adjudication, in which the ECtHR ‘ensure[s] that
every genuine victim of a violation receives a judgment in [its] favour from the Court,
however slight the injury, whatever the bureaucratic cost, whether or not compensation is awarded, and whatever the likely impact of the judgment on the conduct or
practice in question’.69
What, then, are the differences between the constitutional and individual justice
approaches on the one hand and, on the other, the embeddedness principle advocated
in this article? Analysing the ECtHR as embedded in national legal systems differs from
the individual justice approach in its recognition that the Court’s continent-wide geographic and demographic reach makes it impossible to remedy every violation of the
Convention. It also shares with those who conceptualize the ECtHR as a constitutional
court the belief that Strasbourg judges should be strategic in selecting cases to advance
a normative vision of the Convention and its supervisory machinery. But it parts company with constitutional justice adherents regarding the substance of that vision.
Constitutional justice proponents urge the ECtHR to develop trans-jurisdictional
solutions for weighty human rights problems rather than focus on plaintiff- or countryspeciﬁc issues. In contrast, an embeddedness perspective seeks ﬁrst and foremost to
augment the mechanisms available to remedy human rights violations in national
law, obviating the need for individuals to seek relief at the regional level. Where these
national mechanisms are inadequate, the ECtHR should increase its supervision of
domestic courts and political bodies and provide incentives for government actors faithfully to follow the Court’s case law and to remedy Convention violations at home.
Admittedly, the two perspectives overlap if embeddedness is itself treated as a principle of constitutional magnitude. But most constitutional court advocates do not
view the ECtHR’s constitutional functions as extending so broadly. Setting aside this
deﬁnitional alignment, there are many issues where embeddedness and constitutional justice approaches are likely to diverge. These include, for example, cases of
only minor value for explaining novel or unsettled interpretations of civil and political
rights but much greater signiﬁcance for enhancing the penetration of the Convention
and ECtHR case law into national legal systems. In addition, whereas constitutional
justice scholars focus almost exclusively on the work of the Court, an embeddedness
approach gives equal weight to the activities of the Council of Europe’s political and
expert bodies.
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An additional concrete example may help to illustrate the differences between an
embedded court and a constitutional court.70 The legal system in post-Second World
War Italy gave the Italian Constitutional Court exclusive authority to determine
whether domestic legislation was compatible with Italy’s foundational charter.71 But
it also separated the court from the country’s ordinary and administrative tribunals
and its political processes.72 As a result of this formal separation, the Constitutional
Court initially found it difﬁcult to exercise its powers of review. The court faced stiff
resistance from other divisions of the judiciary, which were ‘reluctant to acknowledge
[its] authority’ or refer cases to the court.73 In addition, the Italian Parliament was
often unaware of or disregarded those few rulings that the court issued.74 Stated differently, the Italian Constitutional Court was not embedded in the Italian legal system.
In response to this state of affairs, the Constitutional Court ‘began to use its power in
a very pervasive way’ to expand its jurisdiction and to develop a productive relationship with lower-level tribunals.75 When the court found a statute unconstitutional,
the Italian Constitution prescribed a single response – strike the statute down. But the
court slowly extended the available remedies to include ‘declaring a law partially void’,
replacing ‘one or more words in the law with other words in order to make the same
statute conform to the Constitution’, or interpreting a statute to avoid constitutional
inﬁrmity.76 In addition, the court encouraged ordinary and administrative tribunals to
identify constitutional questions and refer them for a deﬁnitive ruling.77 This process
‘implicate[d] ordinary judges in the constitutional review process’ by giving them ‘a
share in the task of safeguarding the constitution against offensive legislation’.78 But it
did so ‘in a moderate way’ that preserved the Constitutional Court’s ultimate authority.79 As the court’s powers increased, so too did the Italian Parliament’s acceptance of
constitutional constraints on domestic lawmaking.80 As a result of these interrelated
developments, over the course of several decades the Italian Constitutional Court
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embedded itself in the country’s legal and political systems and ‘profoundly modiﬁed
the traditional way of making and applying law typical of Italian legal culture’.81
In the discussion that follows, I document several ways in which the ECtHR is following an analogous trajectory, modifying its jurisprudence and expanding its review
powers to embed itself more ﬁrmly in the national legal systems of the Convention’s
member states.

3 The Council of Europe’s Response to the ECtHR’s Docket
Crisis and Examples of Increasing Embeddedness in Recent
ECHR Jurisprudence
The current drive to reform the Strasbourg supervisory system dates back to a November 2000 ministerial conference marking the ﬁftieth anniversary of the signing of the
European Convention. The recent entry into force of Protocol No. 11 in 1998 had
transformed the ECtHR into ‘a truly permanent, professional judicial body’.82 Only
two years later, however, the ministers issued a troubling announcement, warning
that ‘the effectiveness of the Convention system … is now at issue’ because of ‘the difﬁculties that the Court has encountered in dealing with the ever-increasing volume
of applications’.83
As noted above, two factors were principally responsible for the rising number of
complaints: (1) the accession of former Soviet bloc countries whose transitions to
democracy were often slow and ﬁtful; and (2) systemic human rights problems in
longstanding Convention member states.84 The ministers’ call for a response to the
ECtHR’s looming docket crisis was answered by convening several committees and
working groups to study the problem and propose potential solutions.
The most tangible result of their efforts was Protocol No. 14,85 adopted in May 2004
and now ratiﬁed by 46 of 47 member states.86 The Protocol’s major features are: (1) a
procedure for single judges to decide manifestly inadmissible cases; (2) a new admissibility standard that authorizes the dismissal of complaints whose authors have not
suffered ‘signiﬁcant disadvantage’; (3) provisions to facilitate friendly settlements;

81

82
83

84

85

86

Pizzorusso, ‘Italian and American Models of the Judiciary and of Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparison of Recent Tendencies’, 38 Am J Comp L (1990) 374, at 385–386; Pizzorusso, ‘Constitutional
Review and Legislation in Italy’, in C. Landfried (ed.), Constitutional Review & Legislation: An International
Comparison (1988), at 109, 126.
Caﬂish, supra note 3, at 403.
European Ministerial Conference on Human Rights, Resolution I, Institutional and Functional Arrangements for the Protection of Human Rights at National and European Level (Rome, 3–4 Nov. 2000).
See Res. 1226, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (2000), at para. 7.
Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
amending the control system of the Convention, ETS No. 194, opened for signature 13 May 2004.
Russia is the only hold-out. In Dec. 2006 the State Duma refused to ratify the treaty. I discuss the signiﬁcance of Russia’s (perhaps temporary) refusal to ratify Protocol No. 14 in Part 4C.

142

EJIL 19 (2008), 125–159

and (4) measures to improve the execution of the Court’s judgments.87 The drafters
believe that Protocol No. 14 will ameliorate the Court’s docket crisis. They recognize,
however, that it is only one component of a multi-dimensional, long-term reform
strategy.88
Consistently with that intent and even before the adoption of Protocol No. 14,
the ECHR started to respond to the underlying causes of the surge in applications by
modifying its jurisprudence in three ways. First, the Court adopted the role of a ﬁrstinstance ﬁnder of fact where states failed to investigate alleged human rights violations. Secondly, the ECtHR expanded its interpretation of Article 13 of the Convention,
a provision that requires an effective domestic remedy for violations of protected rights
and freedoms. Thirdly, Strasbourg judges, in a stark reversal of past practice, began to
specify remedies that national governments must provide to individuals whose rights
they have violated. The most notable consequence of this change was the ECtHR’s
creation of a ‘pilot judgment’ procedure to address systemic human rights problems
affecting large numbers of similarly situated individuals. As I explain below, each of
these three jurisprudential shifts has increased the Court’s diffuse embeddedness in
national legal systems.

A The ECHR as First Instance Tribunal and Fact Finder
The subsidiarity principle that infuses the Convention’s supervisory system restricts
the ECtHR’s relationship to the national authorities whose decisions it reviews. The
Court often repeats the mantra that it cannot ‘assume the role’89 nor ‘take the place
of’ those authorities.90 This prohibition applies with particular force to domestic judicial proceedings. The ECtHR refuses to ‘act as a court of appeal, or as sometimes is
said, as a court of fourth instance from the decisions taken by domestic courts’.91 It
generally refrains from interpreting domestic laws and it defers to national courts’
assessments of ‘the credibility of witnesses and the relevance of evidence to the issues
in the case’.92
The Court scrupulously follows these principles when reviewing the actions of
domestic decision-makers in well-functioning democracies. But its responsibility to
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adjudicate Convention violations applies with equal force where a government fails
to investigate alleged human rights abuses or to provide a judicial forum for applicants to substantiate their claims. In such cases – which often involve widespread
civil unrest – the ECtHR ‘inevitably confront[s] … the same difﬁculties as those faced
by any ﬁrst-instance court’.93 It must review the parties’ conﬂicting accounts and
establish the relevant facts. It must create appropriate evidentiary rules and determine the burden and standard of proof necessary to substantiate a violation of the
Convention. And it must decide how to proceed when the government has exclusive
access to information that may corroborate or refute the applicant’s allegations but
fails to provide that information to the Court.94
The ECtHR’s ﬁrst sustained treatment of these issues arose in cases involving human
rights abuses by military and police ofﬁcials in the Kurdish regions of south-eastern
Turkey. In the latter half of the 1990s, complaints alleging forced disappearances,
extrajudicial killings, torture of detainees, and destruction of villages in these regions
began to arrive in Strasbourg. In response, the ECtHR (and before it the European
Human Rights Commission) ‘regularly undertook fact-ﬁnding missions for the purpose
of taking depositions from witnesses’ and inspecting the locations where the alleged
violations had occurred. ‘Thus, even when presented with conﬂicting accounts of the
events or with the Government’s eventual lack of cooperation, the Court … could
draw factual conclusions bas[ed] on those ﬁrst-hand testimonies, to which particular
importance was attached.’95
The ECtHR and the Commission assumed these new tasks with hesitation, recognizing that they ‘must be cautious in taking on the role of a ﬁrst-instance tribunal of fact,
where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case’.96
The tribunals openly acknowledged the challenges of ﬁrst instance fact-ﬁnding,
including the inability to compel witnesses to appear or testify at hearings,97 language
problems, and the ‘lack of detailed and direct familiarity with the conditions pertaining in the region’.98
Over time, however, the ECtHR became more conﬁdent in exercising these factﬁnding powers. Faced with repeated allegations of ﬂagrant violations of the right to
life and the prohibition of torture and degrading or inhuman treatment or punishment, the Court applied ‘a particularly thorough scrutiny’ even where ‘there have
been criminal proceedings in the domestic court[s] concerning [the applicant’s] allegations’99 or where ‘certain domestic proceedings and investigations have already
taken place’.100 At the same time, however, the Court also hinted that it would adopt
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a more deferential posture if Turkish ofﬁcials more thoroughly investigated such
cases.101
The ECtHR’s decision to take on the role of a ﬁrst instance domestic court
‘represent[ed] a signiﬁcant redeﬁnition of the institution’s role’.102 In such cases
– which now include complaints alleging extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and torture in the Chechnya region of Russia103 – the Court ‘ceases to be a
secondary guarantor of human rights and instead ﬁnds itself in a more crucial – and
exposed – front-line position’.104 Scholars have questioned whether the ECtHR possesses the resources and institutional qualiﬁcations necessary to carry out these functions.105 But there is little doubt that this exception to the subsidiarity principle reﬂects
the Court’s commitment to closing gaps in domestic accountability where member
states insufﬁciently investigate credible claims of serious human violations.106

B Enhancing Effective Domestic Remedies for Convention Violations
In addition to its many substantive provisions, the European Convention contains,
in Article 13, a requirement that member states provide ‘an effective remedy before a
national authority’ to ‘[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the treaty]
are violated’.107 The ECtHR has signiﬁcantly expanded the scope of this ‘obscure’108
provision in recent years, encouraging states to augment existing domestic remedies
and create new ones tailored to the violation of different civil and political liberties.
The ECtHR adopted a rather restrictive approach to Article 13 in its early judgments. It refused to interpret the provision to mandate either domestic incorporation of
the Convention or judicial remedies.109 Nevertheless, the Court required an ‘effective’
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Turkey (2006), at para. 83 (rejecting the applicants’ attempt to prove a Convention violation by relying on
a government report of an investigation of the causes of unrest in south-eastern Turkey, and characterizing the report as ‘a serious attempt to provide information on and analyse problems associated with the
ﬁght against terrorism from a general perspective and to recommend … investigative measures’).
Harmsen, supra note 68, at 29.
See, e.g., Imakayeva v. Russia, supra note 93, at paras 117–119.
Harmsen, supra note 68, at 29.
See Kamminga, ‘Is the European Convention on Human Rights Sufﬁciently Equipped to Cope with Gross
and Systematic Violations?’, 12 Neth Q Human Rts (1994) 153.
See App. No. 22494/93, Hasan İlhan v. Turkey (2004), at para. 123 (stating that ‘defects’ in the ‘investigatory system’ in ‘south-east Turkey in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s’ ‘undermined the effectiveness of
criminal-law protection’ and ‘fostered a lack of accountability of members of the security forces for their
actions which was not compatible with the rule of law in a democratic society’).
European Convention, supra note 1, Art. 13.
Malone v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Series A No. 82 (1984), at 37 (partly dissenting opinion of Judges Matcher and Pinheiro Farinha) (stating that Art. 13 ‘constitutes one of the most obscure clauses in the Convention and that its application raises extremely difﬁcult and complicated problems of interpretation’).
See Silver v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Series A No. 61 (1983), at para. 113; Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union
v. Sweden, ECtHR, Series A No. 20 (1984), at para. 50.
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mechanism or mechanisms to review ‘arguable’ claims that the government had
violated the Convention or analogous provisions of national law. Such mechanisms
had to be independent of the ofﬁcials or bodies that committed the alleged violation,
effective in practice as well as in law, capable of investigating allegations fully, and
authorized to make legally binding decisions granting relief to aggrieved individuals.110
Although these cumulative requirements suggest a robust view of domestic remedies,
the ECtHR’s early application of these principles rarely resulted in a ﬁnding of an Article
13 violation.111
In recent years, however, the Court has more rigorously scrutinized claims that
governments have failed to provide effective domestic remedies. The ECtHR has, for
example, found violations of Article 13 even after concluding that the state had not
breached the substantive right that formed the basis of the applicant’s complaint.112 It
has ‘strictly examined the powers, procedures and independence of non-judicial bodies when evaluating if they provide effective remedies under Article 13’.113 And it has
emphasized that ‘the requirements of Article 13 … take the form of a guarantee’ that
is ‘one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society’.114
Tailoring domestic remedies to ‘the nature of the applicant’s complaint’ is among
the more signiﬁcant developments in Article 13 jurisprudence.115 ‘[I]n cases of suspicious death or ill-treatment’, for example, the ECtHR has held that the ‘fundamental
importance’ of the right to life and the prohibition of torture require ‘a thorough and
effective investigation capable of leading to the identiﬁcation and punishment of those
responsible for the acts of ill-treatment’.116 Similarly, in asylum and deportation cases,
the Court has stressed ‘the irreversible nature of the harm that might occur if the risk
of torture or ill-treatment alleged [by the applicant] materialised’. It has accordingly
interpreted Article 13 to require the government to suspend deportation proceedings
pending an ‘independent and rigorous scrutiny’ of the applicant’s claims.117
To determine whether states have satisﬁed their Article 13 obligations, the ECtHR
has carefully analysed domestic remedies, often in excruciating detail.118 Such
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See A.R. Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights
by the European Court of Human Rights (2004), at 205–207; D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human
Rights Law (2nd edn., 2006), at 123.
See Thune, ‘The Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Law: Article 13 of the European Convention on
Human Rights’, in D. Gomien (ed.), Broadening the Frontiers of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Asbjorne
Eide (1993), at 79, 82, 83 (stating that ‘Article 13 is often invoked by complainants, but … the complaint
is rarely successful’, and noting that, as of 1992, the ECHR had found violations of Art. 13 in only 3 of 46
cases in which applicants alleged a violation of the provision).
See, e.g., App. No. 59450/00, Ramirez Sanchez v. France (Grand Chamber, 2006), at paras 157–160.
Mowbray, supra note 110, at 207.
App. No. 51564/99, Čonka v. Belgium (2002), at para. 83.
E.g. App. No. 38361/97, Anguelova v. Bulgaria (2002), at para. 161.
App. No. 48254/99, Cobzaru v. Romania (2007), at para. 82 (summarizing earlier case law).
Čonka v. Belgium, supra note 114 , at para. 79; App. No. 40035/98, Jabari v. Turkey (2000), at para. 50.
See, e.g., Čonka v. Belgium, supra note 114 , at para. 83 (reviewing the procedures and practices by which
the Belgian Conseil d’Etat may stay execution of a collective expulsion order and concluding that the
remedy was ‘too uncertain to enable the requirements of Article 13 to be satisﬁed’); App. No. 75529/01,
Sürmeli v. Germany (Grand Chamber, 2006), at paras 80–115 (examining in detail four distinct remedies
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scrutiny has triggered a sharp response from some states, which have argued that
this approach risks overburdening their judicial and administrative systems. The
Court’s reply has been unyielding: ‘Article 13 imposes on the Contracting States the
duty to organise their judicial systems in such a way that their courts can meet its
requirements.’119
The ECtHR has even required remedies for excessively lengthy judicial proceedings,
which, as noted above, account for a large percentage of applications to Strasbourg.
In doing so, the Court bolstered the treaty’s speedy justice right by compelling states
to ‘prevent[] the alleged violation or its continuation, or … provid[e] adequate redress
for any violation that ha[s] already occurred’.120 In the absence of such domestic remedies, ‘individuals will systematically be forced to refer to the Court in Strasbourg complaints that would otherwise, and in the Court’s opinion more appropriately, have to
be addressed in the ﬁrst place within the national legal system’.121 In short, the ECtHR
has used Article 13 both to ameliorate its own docket crisis and, more fundamentally,
to reshape national legal systems to increase the likelihood that state ofﬁcials will remedy human rights violations at home.

C Expanding the ECtHR’s Remedial Powers: Non-monetary
Reparations and Pilot Judgments
The ECtHR long adhered to a modest conception of its remedial powers. Its judgments
simply declared whether a violation of the Convention had occurred. The Court did
‘not even consider [itself] competent to make recommendations to the condemned
State as to which steps it should take to remedy the consequences of the treaty violation’.122 Only if national law failed to provide full reparation did the ECtHR award ‘just
satisfaction’ to the complainant in the form of monetary compensation.123 In all other
respects, the Court entrusted responsibility for executing its judgments to the Committee of Ministers.124 This deference was consistent with the intention of the treaty’s
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that the government alleged were available to challenge excessively lengthy proceedings – a constitutional complaint, an appeal to a higher authority, a special complaint alleging inaction, and an action for
damages – and concluding that all four were ineffective and thus insufﬁcient to satisfy Art. 13).
Ibid., at para. 84; see also App. No. 18015/03, Schutte v. Austria (2007), at para. 36 (rejecting the government’s argument that states parties ‘should not be required under Article 13 to provide a remedy
against delays caused by one of its highest courts’); Sürmeli v. Germany, supra note 118, at para. 104
(stating that the ECtHR had recently ‘undertaken a closer examination of the effectiveness, within the
meaning of Article 13 of the Convention, of remedies in a number of Contracting States in respect of the
length of proceedings’).
App. No. 30210/96, Kudła v. Poland (2000), at para. 158. In more recent judgments, the ECtHR has
stated that ‘the best solution’ is ‘a remedy designed to expedite the proceedings in order to prevent them
from becoming excessively lengthy’ in the ﬁrst instance: see, e.g., Sürmeli v. Germany, supra note 118, at
para. 100.
Kudła v. Poland, supra note 120, at para. 155.
Barkuysen and van Emmerik, supra note 52, at 3.
European Convention, supra note 1, Art. 41.
See Barkuysen and van Emmerik, supra note 52, at 20 (describing supervision and enforcement of ECtHR
judgments by the Committee of Ministers).
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drafters, who sought to create a ‘sovereignty shield’ that limited the Court’s intrusiveness by specifying that any ‘reparation to the injured party was to be owed only to the
extent that it could be provided within the conﬁnes of the domestic legal order’.125
Within the last few years, however, the ECtHR has included speciﬁc remedial obligations in several high-proﬁle judgments. This change, which some commentators
characterize as a ‘radical’ departure from the Court’s past practice,126 developed in
response to the Council of Europe’s judicial reform process launched in 2000. Political and expert bodies in the Council, tasked with identifying ways to improve the
execution of ECHR judgments, identiﬁed the Court’s unwillingness to identify speciﬁc
remedies as an impediment to speedy and full compliance.127 The refusal had sometimes generated disputes within the Committee of Ministers concerning the scope of
a respondent state’s legal obligations.128 It also allowed states to interpret judgments
narrowly, arguing that they were ‘free to make minimal changes to national law or
no changes at all’.129
Shortly after the publication of these criticisms, the ECtHR ﬁrst articulated speciﬁc
reparations in judgments ﬁnding a violation of the Convention. The Court initially
conﬁned these pronouncements to ‘a limited number of speciﬁc areas where there
[was] an obvious limited choice as to how implementation should be conducted’.130
The practice soon became more commonplace, with the ECtHR ordering or recommending remedies that penetrate deeply into the fabric of national law.131 They
include re-opening closed judicial proceedings, revising statutes, releasing illegally
detained individuals, and restoring seized property to its owner.132 Reviewing these
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Von Staden, ‘Assessing the Impact of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights on Domestic
Human Rights Policies’, paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (1 Sept. 2007), at 7 (citing D. Leeb, Die innerstaatliche Umsetzung der Feststellungsurteile
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Leach, ‘Beyond the Bug River – A New Dawn for Redress Before the European Court of Human Rights’
[2005] Eur Human Rts L Rev 147, at 149 (‘in one notable area the Court has begun to throw off former
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See European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Implementation of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Op. No. 209/2002 (Dec. 2002); see also Bates,
‘Supervision of the Execution of Judgments delivered by the European Court of Human Rights: The Challenges Facing the Committee of Ministers’, in Christou and Raymond, supra note 52, at 49, 70 and n. 94
(citing reports and resolutions criticizing the ECtHR for lack of clarity in specifying remedial measures).
Bates, supra note 127, at 70 and n. 93; see also von Staden, supra note 125, at 9 (stating that ‘even
though [a] case decided at Strasbourg implicates a general governmental policy, such as a particular
legal provision, the state may seek to portray the violation found by the Court as unique and thus limit its
response to the individual case, thereby avoiding a change in its general policy’).
Cameron, supra note 65, at 228.
Bates, supra note 127, at 70 and n. 94.
The remedies that the Court indicates are legally binding when they are phrased in mandatory language
and appear in the operative part of the judgment. In other cases, the Court phrases remedies as recommendations rather than obligatory commands: see Colandrea, ‘On the Power of the European Court of
Human Rights to Order Speciﬁc Non-monetary Measures: Some Remarks in Light of the Assandize, Broniowski and Sejdovic Cases’, 7 Human Rts L Rev (2007) 396, at 397–399.
See ibid., at 398–403 (reviewing case law).
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cases, one commentator has proclaimed, perhaps prematurely, that ‘the shackles
of a merely declaratory approach to redress have now, rightly, been thrown off for
good’.133
A second remedial issue that has received signiﬁcant attention in the Council of
Europe reform process concerns human rights problems that affect large groups of
similarly situated individuals. In 2004, the Committee of Ministers issued a resolution inviting the ECtHR to identify in its judgments ‘what it considers to be an
underlying systemic problem and the source of that problem, in particular when
it is likely to give rise to numerous applications, so as to assist States in ﬁnding the
appropriate solution and the Committee of Ministers in supervising the execution of
judgments’.134
Only a month later, the ECtHR delivered its ﬁrst ‘pilot judgment’ in Broniowski
v. Poland,135 a case involving a landowner forced to abandon property after a shift
in the country’s borders following the Second World War. The dispute ‘originated
in a widespread problem which results from a malfunctioning of Polish legislation
and administrative practice’ affecting 80,000 property claimants and 167 pending
applications.136 After ﬁnding a violation of the right to property, the ECtHR held that
Poland was obligated to provide a remedy ‘at national level’ that ‘take[s] into account
the many people affected. Above all, the measures adopted must be such as to remedy
the systemic defect underlying the Court’s ﬁnding of a violation so as not to overburden the Convention system with large numbers of applications deriving from the same
cause.’137 One year later, the Court approved a friendly settlement of the dispute, but
only after Poland had enacted new legislation that provided compensatory remedies
to all of the former property owners.138
The ECtHR’s creation of international law’s ﬁrst class action mechanism139 ‘saved
the Court an enormous amount of time and labour’ and dramatically publicized its
determination to ﬁnd comprehensive solutions to systemic human rights problems.140
The Court has since applied the pilot judgment procedure to civil and political rights
violations in other member states.141 And it has indicated that its review encompasses not only identifying structural violations but also scrutinizing the legislation
and administrative regulations that national governments adopt to comply with its
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Court formulate a speciﬁc measure’).
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Ibid., at para. 189.
Ibid., at para. 193.
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Caﬂisch, supra note 3, at 413; see also Leach, supra note 126, at 162–163.
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remedial orders and recommendations.142 Stated differently, the ECtHR has arrogated
to itself the power to monitor compliance with its most far-reaching judgments, a
power that was previously the exclusive province of the Council of Europe’s political
bodies.

4 Evaluating Proposals to Redesign the ECtHR:
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the
Strasbourg Supervisory System
The previous parts of this article identiﬁed several areas in which the ECtHR has
revised its case law to increase its scrutiny of member states’ human rights practices. Ameliorating the Court’s looming docket crisis provides a partial explanation
of these marked jurisprudential shifts. The new pilot judgment procedure, for example, compels governments to ﬁnd systemic solutions for widespread human rights
problems and thereby preclude large numbers of applicants from ﬁling complaints
in Strasbourg.
At a more fundamental level, however, the recent changes in the Court’s case law
reﬂect the emergence of diffuse embeddedness as a deep structural principle of the
European human rights regime.143 Embeddedness does not supplant subsidiarity, a
long-held tenet of the Convention’s supervisory system. Rather, embeddedness serves
as subsidiarity’s necessary complement. It authorizes the ECtHR to adopt a more interventionist stance when the justiﬁcations for deference to national decision-makers are
diminished or absent. Where, for example, regions or localities are overwhelmed by
violence, or inefﬁcient domestic judicial systems make timely and effective remedies a
practical impossibility, the core values underlying the Convention’s ‘special character
as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights’,144 are best served by giving
the ECtHR a more assertive (but hopefully temporary) supervisory role.
To be clear, enhanced regional supervision does not seek to aggrandize the powers
of the ECtHR or those of the Council of Europe. Its short-term objectives are, instead,
to bolster the capacity of national institutions and to ‘backstop domestic political and
legal groups trying to comply with international legal obligations’.145 The ultimate
aim, however, is to revive the subsidiarity doctrine when domestic decision-makers
have resumed their rightful position as the Convention’s ﬁrst-line defenders.
Admittedly, these goals are audacious. They cannot be achieved by the Court alone.
And even with the full backing of the Council of Europe’s political and expert bodies,
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they face several potential obstacles. These challenges notwithstanding, I argue that
the embeddedness principle is an appropriate aspiration for the world’s most advanced
human rights system – a system that has proved its ability to evolve institutionally,
politically, and legally, and whose member states have now unanimously incorporated
international human rights standards into their respective national laws.
In the sections that follow, I ﬁrst review judicial reform proposals that the Council
of Europe has already adopted or is currently considering that would increase the connections between the ECtHR and national courts and parliaments, further embedding
the Court in domestic legal systems. I then discuss several additional measures that
would augment the diffuse embeddedness principle and extend it to the Council of
Europe’s political and expert bodies. I conclude by discussing the obstacles to implementing these and other reform proposals.

A Reforms that Further Embed the ECtHR in National Legal Systems
As explained above, the ECtHR is not directly embedded in domestic legal systems.146
It has no mechanism – such as the ECJ’s preliminary reference procedure – to forge
direct links to national courts or government institutions. Four recently implemented or proposed reforms of the Strasbourg supervisory system would, however,
strengthen the Court’s connections to national courts and, to a lesser extent, to
national parliaments.
The ﬁrst reform is already underway. In 2000, the Committee of Ministers launched
an ambitious programme to convince national governments to authorize their courts
to reopen judicial proceedings following an adverse ECtHR judgment.147 In response
to this initiative, ‘[m]ore than a dozen member states have adopted legislation providing for the reopening of criminal proceedings and a number of courts have developed
their case-law so as to allow for such reopening’.148 As of 2006, such remedies are
now available in 80 per cent of member states in criminal cases and about half of the
Convention countries in civil and administrative cases.149 These changes are likely
to enhance embeddedness in two complementary ways. First, an increasing number
of national courts will be empowered to execute, more or less automatically, ECtHR
judgments that ﬁnd fault with domestic trials. Secondly, Strasbourg judges, aware of
this fact, can target their increasingly precise remedial orders and recommendations
directly to their domestic judicial counterparts.
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See supra Part 2C.
See Recommendation Rec(2000)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the re-examination
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A second reform was recently proposed by the ‘Group of Wise Persons’, a panel of
experts charged with studying the long-term effectiveness of the European human
rights system. In its ﬁnal report published in November 2006, the experts recommended
‘institutionalising the links between the [ECtHR] and the highest courts in the member states’ by authorizing the latter courts to ‘apply to the [ECtHR] for advisory opinions’.150 The goal of this ‘innovation’ is to ‘foster dialogue between international and
domestic judges’ and ‘enhance the Court’s “constitutional” role’.151 To reduce the
pressure on the ECtHR’s already overburdened case load, the report proposed that
‘only constitutional courts or courts of last instance’ be authorized to seek non-binding opinions from the ECtHR and that their requests should ‘only concern questions or
principle or of general interest relating to the interpretation’ of the Convention.152
A third proposal to redesign the ECtHR, also advocated by the Group of Wise Persons,
would shift responsibility for awarding monetary damages to successful complainants
from the ECtHR to national courts. Under the Group’s proposal, each member state
would ‘designate a judicial body with responsibility for determining the amount of
compensation’ within the time limits set by the Court and following the ‘criteria laid
down in the Court’s case-law’.153 Dissatisﬁed complainants could challenge these damage awards before the ECtHR.154 If the member states agree to adopt this new remedial
structure, the ECtHR will, for the ﬁrst time, exercise appellate review over domestic
judges, who, in turn, will act as compliance partners for the monetary component of
all ECtHR judgments.
A fourth institutional reform with ancillary embedding effects concerns an ongoing
effort to ensure that draft statutes, existing legislation, and administrative practices
comply with the Convention and with ECtHR case law. In 2004, the Committee of
Ministers urged member states to adopt ‘appropriate and effective mechanisms for
systematically verifying’ the treaty-compatibility of domestic laws.155 These review
procedures – which are now in place in various forms in all member states – help
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domestic institutions to identify potential treaty violations before they generate
complaints to Strasbourg.156 The Committee of Ministers has recently recommended
that the ECtHR become more involved in this veriﬁcation process.157 This would
occur, for example, if member states adopted the Group of Wise Persons’ proposal to
allow constitutional and supreme courts to request advisory opinions from the ECtHR.
When exercising the veriﬁcation functions already entrusted to them under national
law,158 these domestic courts could ask Strasbourg judges to review the Conventioncompatibility of existing or proposed legislation.
These four initiatives raise complex issues of institutional design. Some may increase
the ECtHR’s already overburdened case load, at least in the short term. Others are
long-term solutions that require revising not only the ECtHR’s powers – revisions
that the Court itself may view unfavourably159 – but also the jurisdiction of domestic
courts.160 Taken together, however, the initiatives reveal that many reform proposals nominally intended to ease the ECtHR’s docket crisis will also enhance the links
between the Court and the disaggregated branches of national governments.

B Additional Proposals to Promote Diffuse Embeddedness
The initiatives reviewed above would further embed the ECtHR in national legal and
political systems. However, the proposals were drafted with different aims – to reduce the
Court’s case load and improve compliance with its judgments. To more ﬁrmly implant
diffuse embeddedness as a deep structural principle of the Convention, additional measures will be likely to be needed. Some measures can be implemented by the ECtHR itself.
Others will require action by the Council of Europe and its member states.161 I discuss
several proposals below, reviewing them roughly in the order of the ease of their implementation. Before doing so, however, I note an important caveat – each proposal is preliminary and deserves more extended analysis than I can provide in this article.
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The easiest and least controversial measure concerns the new admissibility rule in
Protocol No. 14. This provision authorizes the ECtHR to dismiss a complaint if it determines that the applicant ‘has not suffered a signiﬁcant disadvantage, unless respect
for human rights as deﬁned in the Convention and the Protocols requires an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on
this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal’.162 According
to Protocol No. 14’s explanatory report, dismissal of cases in which an individual has
suffered only ‘trivial’ harm is consistent with the subsidiarity principle and allows the
ECtHR to manage its workload more effectively.163 The Court cannot reject such complaints, however, if respect for human rights requires an examination of their merits
or if the claims have never been considered by a domestic court. The drafters left these
two ‘safeguard’ clauses, as well as the ‘signiﬁcant disadvantage’ clause itself, ‘open to
interpretation’ to allow the ECtHR to clarify their precise meaning.164
Consistent with this intent, the ECtHR should interpret the new admissibility rule
to bolster its indirect control over national courts. In particular, it should create an
incentive for domestic judges to apply the Convention as interpreted by the ECtHR.
Consider as an example a case concerning a civil or political right with respect to
which the Court has developed an extensive jurisprudence. When a national court,
reviewing a complaint alleging a violation of that right, applies the treaty’s text (or
its national law equivalent) without considering this case law, the ECtHR should hold
that the complaint has ‘not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal’ and cannot
be dismissed under the new admissibility rule. This interpretation sends a clear signal to domestic judges – the closer they adhere to ECtHR jurisprudence, the greater
the chance they will avoid the ‘international embarrassment’ of a later reversal in
Strasbourg.165 Over time, this strategic interpretation will increase the respect that
national courts give to ECtHR judgments and enhance the opportunities to remedy
treaty violations at home.
A second way to enhance embeddedness concerns the award of non-monetary
remedies. As described above, the ECtHR recently changed its longstanding practice
of refusing to identify the remedial measures that states must adopt to comply with its
rulings.166 The Court has not, however, indicated such measures in every judgment,
creating needless uncertainty for states and inequity among applicants. Consistently
with Protocol No. 11’s grant of direct access to individuals and with the Convention’s effectiveness principle,167 the Court should identify appropriate non-monetary
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remedies in its judgments whenever such remedies will restore applicants to the status
quo prior to the violation.168 Such remedial speciﬁcity has important consequences
for embeddedness. It helps applicants to pressure governments to comply with the
Court’s judgments and it facilitates the Council of Europe’s enhanced efforts to monitor domestic enforcement of those rulings.169
The new pilot judgment procedure raises a third embeddedness issue. The ECtHR has
now issued several judgments addressing systemic human rights problems. Although
the Court does not always use the pilot judgment label to describe such cases, it consistently indicates general measures that governments should adopt to implement its
rulings.170 The Court has given almost no attention, however, to the fairness of the
procedure itself.
The very name ‘pilot judgment’ signiﬁes that the ECtHR uses the ﬁrst application
that comes before it to address systemic violations of the Convention challenged in
other complaints. But there is no guarantee that that ﬁrst case accurately reﬂects all
of the factual and legal issues raised by such violations. In addition, the ﬁrst applicant
enjoys privileged status relative to other complainants. During the time that the ﬁrst
complaint is under review, the other applications remain in stasis.171 More troubling is
the possibility that the ﬁrst applicant will negotiate a friendly settlement that favours
an individual damages award over systemic non-monetary remedies.172 If the pilot
judgment procedure is to serve as an effective tool for improving compliance with
the Convention, the ECtHR must pay greater heed to the procedure’s legitimacy. The
Court must develop safeguards to ensure that class-wide relief applies to all similarly
situated applicants and is appropriate to the systemic human rights issues it has adjudicated on.
A fourth and more far-reaching way to anchor embeddedness as a deep structural
principle would be to expand member states’ obligations to provide effective domestic
remedies for Convention violations. The ECtHR has already taken the ﬁrst steps toward
this goal in its recent interpretations of Article 13 analysed above.173 The Council of
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See Garlicki, supra note 141, at 186–191.
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See supra Part 3B.
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Europe’s political bodies have cited these developments with approval. In a 2004 recommendation ‘on the improvement of domestic remedies’, the Committee of Ministers urged the member states ‘constant[ly to] review’ the Court’s case law to ensure
that such remedies ‘exist for anyone with an arguable complaint of a violation of the
Convention, and that these remedies are effective, in that they can result in a decision
on the merits of the complaint and adequate redress for any violation found’.174
The Committee’s endorsement provides political support for the ECtHR further to
expand its Article 13 jurisprudence.175 The Court could, for example, more precisely
deﬁne the type of investigations or compensatory relief required for different Convention violations and tighten the standards for deciding whether domestic remedies qualify as effective.176 There is, however, only so far that Strasbourg judges can plausibly
stretch Article 13’s text. A more radical expansion of domestic remedies will require
a new protocol, subject to ratiﬁcation by each member state. If political support for
such a protocol is uncertain, its drafters could adopt a moderate text that requires
states to ‘make available at the national level some easily accessible mechanism for
making full and rapid reparation for any violation of the Convention that has been
found in a judgment by the Court’.177 A more ambitious protocol would build upon the
recent incorporation of the European Convention into the domestic laws of all member
states and ‘require effective judicial remedies’. Such a protocol could ‘grant … jurisdiction to all domestic courts … to consider complaints about the violation of Convention standards when adjudicating complaints against public authorities’ and provide
‘individual constitutional complaints processes to all national constitutional courts or
their equivalents’.178
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the more far-reaching initiatives to promote
embeddedness will require the support of the Council of Europe. The member states of
the Council, acting as a collective, must provide the political and ﬁnancial assistance
needed to encourage, cajole, and, where necessary, sanction insufﬁciently resourced
or recalcitrant countries to deter human rights violations from occurring and to remedy breaches of the Convention once they have occurred.
To achieve these results, the Council should, ﬁrst and foremost, increase the resources
available for educating and training government authorities, law enforcement ofﬁcials, and domestic judges (especially those serving on lower and administrative
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courts) about the European human rights regime.179 The goal is to convert these public actors into the Convention’s ﬁrst-line defenders and, failing that, into ‘compliance
constituencies’ for the Court in the wake of an adverse ruling against the state.180 Given
the large number of countries and audiences to which such outreach efforts might be
directed, ‘it makes more sense … for scarce resources to be targeted upon low-compliance states than all states equally’,181 and to emphasize rights and freedoms that are
relevant to different audiences.
The Council should also consider more focused strategies to promote embeddedness. One such strategy involves expanding the activities of National Human Rights
Institutions (NHRIs).182 The Council of Europe could restructure the Convention’s
supervisory system to enable these domestic advocates for civil and political liberties to
assist it in a variety of ways. Such assistance could include preparing periodic reports
of human rights ‘hot spots’ in Europe; empowering NHRIs to ﬁle complaints alleging
Convention violations with constitutional or high courts; authorizing them to intervene in pilot judgment cases to provide additional information about the systemic
human rights problems under review; and assisting the Committee of Ministers and
the Parliamentary Assembly in policing compliance with the Court’s judgments.183
More difﬁcult issues arise where a country fails to comply with ECtHR judgments
against it. The Council should develop a suite of ‘positive incentives’ and ‘punishment
mechanisms’ – carrots and sticks, to use more colloquial language – that it deploys
to induce compliance with ECtHR rulings.184 Positive incentives include foreign aid,
democracy assistance programmes, and funds to support domestic non-governmental organizations. In the past, the Council has used these measures to reward former
Soviet bloc countries for implementing the commitments they made when joining the
organization and to spur additional reforms.185 It could follow a similar strategy to
encourage compliance with ECtHR judgments, in particular those that address systemic human rights problems.186
Sanctions for non-compliance should be graded according to the nature of the violation and the reason the state proffers for failing to comply. The sticks available to
the Council include fact-ﬁnding missions to investigate the causes of non-compliance,
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meetings with political representatives to elicit speciﬁc timetables for implementation,
and, as a last resort, suspending the beneﬁts of Council membership. In April 2000, for
example, the Parliamentary Assembly temporarily suspended Russia’s voting privileges in reaction to a critical report by Council of Europe experts who had recently
visited Chechnya. Commentators are divided, however, over whether even this relatively mild sanction engendered any material improvement of human rights practices
in the region.187

C. Impediments to Redesigning the ECtHR
Proposals to redesign the ECtHR have thus far been developed with strong backing
from the Council of Europe’s member states. The widespread support for these reforms
is remarkable, given that the Court will possess greater authority to restrict government regulation of an expanding array of civil and political liberties. It is uncertain,
however, how far the political will for change extends. In particular, the Council faces
two obstacles to embedding the ECtHR more deeply in national legal systems.
The ﬁrst impediment involves the growing geographic disparity in the Court’s case
load. As of 1 January 2007, ﬁve states – Poland, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and the
Ukraine – together accounted for 57 per cent of all applications to the ECtHR, with
Russia alone the source of more than 21 per cent of complaints.188 The disproportionate number of cases emanating from this small number of countries creates political
fault lines that threaten to derail the ECtHR reform process.
The most overt resistance has come from Russia, which in December 2006 became
the only member of the Council of Europe to reject Protocol No. 14, thus preventing its entry into force. Some representatives in the State Duma pointed to the Protocol’s single-judge screening procedure to justify the refusal to ratify the treaty.189
But resistance to reforms runs far deeper and reﬂects the government’s opposition to
ECtHR judgments involving extrajudicial killings in Chechnya, the refusal to extradite
Chechen rebels from Georgia, and a dispute involving the separatist Transdniestria
region of Moldova.190 These cases have soured the relationship between the Russian
government and the Council.191
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Russia’s rejection of Protocol No. 14 may, however, be only a temporary ploy. The
country’s status as the only protocol hold-out state offers a tempting opportunity to
negotiate concessions from other European countries – a tactic Russian government
employed when it ﬁrst rejected but later ratiﬁed the Kyoto Protocol.192 On the other
hand, the growing number of complaints against Russia, which, as noted above, now
comprise nearly one quarter of all applications to the ECtHR, may entrench resistance
to reforms that ‘facilitate[e] the efﬁcient determination of cases by the Court’.193
A second obstacle to creating a more embedded human rights regime concerns the
ECtHR’s relationship with national courts. As noted above, many proposals to redesign the ECtHR seek to strengthen the ties between the judges in Strasbourg and their
domestic colleagues.194 The cooperation of national judiciaries is essential to maintaining and improving compliance with European human rights standards. Enhancing domestic judicial support for the ECtHR faces at least two challenges, however.
First, in countries where courts are not fully independent, judges may be reluctant
to exercise the muscular judicial review needed to remedy Convention violations at
home. Where executive branch ofﬁcials or legislators maintain substantial control
over judicial appointments, retentions, or salaries, a judge’s interest in professional
survival sharply diminishes his or her incentive to hold governments accountable
for human rights abuses. This highlights the importance of developing long-term
initiatives to promote judicial independence, bolster democratic institutions, and
educate and train judges and other public ofﬁcials concerning the Convention’s
requirements.195
A second and more serious challenge to the ECtHR’s collaboration with national
courts arises where those courts are themselves the source of Convention violations.
As noted above, more than half of the Court’s recent judgments concern unfair trials
and excessively lengthy judicial proceedings.196 These defects in the domestic administration of justice reveal that the primary guarantors of individual rights in Europe
are also often its primary violators. Since most due process violations are committed
by lower-level tribunals, the ECtHR should encourage constitutional and supreme
courts to apply Convention case law to resolve such cases before they generate a wave
of complaints to Strasbourg.197 The Court should also use the pilot judgment procedure to require national parliaments to remedy due process violations caused by inadequately resourced and overburdened domestic judiciaries. These approaches may be
supplemented by political strategies, including the ‘carrots and sticks’ discussed in the
previous section.
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5 Conclusion
The individual complaints mechanism of the ECtHR is the crown jewel of the world’s
most advanced international system for protecting civil and political liberties. In this
article, I have argued that the recent proposals to redesign the ECtHR in response to
a growing backlog of complaints should be understood not as ministerial changes in
judicial procedure, nor as resolving the debate over whether the ECtHR should strive
for individual or constitutional justice, but rather as raising more fundamental questions concerning the Court’s future identity. In particular, I have asserted that the
Council of Europe, its member states, and ECtHR judges should recognize diffuse
embeddedness as a deep structural principle of the European Convention, a principle that functions as a necessary complement to the subsidiary doctrine that has animated the region’s human rights regime since its inception.
Embeddedness, as deﬁned in this article, requires the Council of Europe’s political and judicial bodies to bolster domestic mechanisms for remedying Convention
violations at home, obviating the need for aggrieved individuals to seek relief at the
regional level. The absence or inadequacy of these mechanisms justiﬁes expanding
the ECtHR’s review powers, albeit temporarily, until national decision-makers begin
to function (or once again function) as the ﬁrst-line defenders of the Convention’s
rights and freedoms.
In recent years, the ECtHR has modiﬁed its jurisprudence to embed itself more ﬁrmly
in national legal and political systems. Where domestic authorities refuse to investigate human rights abuses, for example, the Court has acted as a ﬁrst instance tribunal
with the power to ﬁnd facts necessary to decide whether the government has violated
the applicant’s rights. The ECtHR has also developed a more capacious understanding of the Convention’s domestic remedies provision. And it has markedly expanded
its remedial powers, issuing rulings that require states to provide speciﬁc non-monetary reparation and creating a novel pilot judgment procedure to remedy systemic
violations.
This article has identiﬁed several ways to extend these jurisprudential trends to
enhance the ECtHR’s embeddedness. In addition to these judicial responses, strengthening the capacity of domestic institutions to remedy human rights violations requires
political strategies. Short-term strategies include deploying positive incentives and
graded sanctions to induce compliance with speciﬁc ECtHR judgments. Longer-term
approaches include expanding resources devoted to promoting judicial independence
and training public ofﬁcials in Strasbourg case law, actions that are appropriate when
the will to remedy violations exists but the capacity to do so is lacking. In addition to
improving adherence to ECtHR judgments, this combination of judicial and political
action will help galvanize domestic interest groups to lobby and litigate for greater
compliance, encouraging governments to remedy human rights violations at home
and providing a more lasting solution to the ECtHR’s docket crisis.

